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Groups are social constructions with difTercnces. People spcntaneously 
attempt to explain difTcrcnccs betwccn groups. Stercotypcs oftcn play lhis 
cxplanalory role. Specifically, group membel'$ lend 10 auribule difTercnl 
essences to social categories. Givcn widespread clhnocentrism, il is nol 
surprising thal individuals reserve " lhc human essence" for lheir ingroup. 
while other groups are allributed a lesser humanily. This phcnomcnon is called 
infra-humanisalion and happens outside people's awarcness. Sttondary 
cmolions (e.g., lovc, hope, contempl, resenlmcnl) are considered uniquely 
human emotions in contras! 10 primary emolions (e.g., joy. surprisc, fear. 
nnger) lhat are sharcd with animals. Thc research progrnmme summarised in 
1his chapler demonslrales lhrough various paradigms 1ha1 members of groups 
nol only auribule more secondary emolions 10 their ingroup than 10 
outgroups, bul are also rcluctanl to associate these emotions with outgroups. 
Moreover, people behave less cooperatively with an outgroup member who 
expresses himself wilh secondary emotions lhan with an ingroup member who 
uses the same terms. lntereslingly, infra-humanisalion occurs for botb high-
and low-stalus groups, cven in the absence of conflict bclwcen groups. 
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Groups are categories that are socially constructed. What are the bases on 
which these constructions rely? Recently, researchers have argued for a 
psychological essentialist theory of categorisation. Departing from classical 
and probabilistic views of categories, Medin and Ortony (1989; Medin, 
1989) proposed an essentialist approach to the social world by lay 
perceivers. Classical views of categorisat ion (Aristotle, 1941) assumed that 
categories were constituted of a series of necessary features, collectively 
sufficient to determine membership in the category. Probabilistic views held 
that categories were ill defined and that membership was dependen! on 
simi1arity with a prototype (Rosch, 1975) or with an aoeessible exemplar 
(Smith & Medin, 1981) of the category. Essentialist views of categorisation 
were developed around a theory-based approach (Medin, 1989; Medin & 
Ortony, 1989). According to essentialist views, categories are organised 
around theories about the deeper features of the category members. These 
theories provide the causal linkage from the deeper fcatures to tbe more 
surface ones and, doing so, cxplain why things look the way tbey do. 
In the present review, we develop a theory of intcrgroup relations that 
examines the essentiaHst theories of social categorisation. Specifically, we 
will show that la y perceivers attribute differentiated essences lo social groups 
in their cnvironment. Building on investigations of intergroup relations, we 
will argue and provide empirical support suggesting that tbe best "human" 
essence is reserved for one's ingroups and tbat outgroups are under· 
attributed typical human. features. 
THE HUMAN ESSENCE 
The core idea of psychological essentialism is that "people act as if things 
(e.g., objects) have essences or underlying natures that make them tbe thing 
they are . Furthermore, the essence constrains or generales properties that 
may vary in their centrality . . .. theories .. . embody or provide causal 
linkages from deeper properties lo more superficial or surface properties" 
(Medin, 1989, p. 1476). Building on Medin's work, Rothbart and Taylor 
( 1 992) identified three types of categories that people are confronted with: 
natural , artifactual, and social. Natural catcgories (e.g., birds, lions, human 
beings) closely correspond lo the pre-Darwinian concept of species; that is, 
natural kinds exist independently of human activities and are associated 
with an underlying essence. Their nature is believed to be relatively 
immutable and is considered to be a rich source of inductive potential. In 
contrast to natural kinds, artifactual objects (e.g., tables, computers) reflect 
humans' needs and desires. Artifacts are defined by their sole function and 
are not believed lo reflect any particular essence. Consequently, there is 
great variability among art.ifactual objects and they do not permit further 
inferences. Turning to social groups, Rothbart and Taylor ( 1992) suggest 
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that, because social categories (e.g., Europeans, blue-collars) primarily 
reftect humans' needs and desires, one should understand them as artifactual 
objccts. However, they argued, people usually tend to treat them as natural, 
and consequently, toa !tribute underlying essences to them. This essentialist 
attribution is illogical in as muchas groups are social constructions that, by 
definition, cannot have an essence. 
An increasing number of social psychologists now rely on subjective 
essentialism to exam.ine la y perceptions of social groups (Demoulin, Leyens, 
& Yzerbyt, 2003; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000, 2002; Yzerbyt , 
Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). Surprisingly, although many agree on 
subjective essentialism theorising, almos! no one has attempted to define the 
nature of the essence attributed to social groups. Most authors consider 
that, because people do not explicitly need lo know what the essence is lo 
actual! y essentialise groups, cxamining the na tu re of cssences is a secondary 
question of relatively little importance (Miller & Prenticc, 1999). 
In lhe research programme presented in this chapter, we have tried to 
answer the question: "Whal could be the human essence?". We asked 
French-speaking students in Louvain-La-Neuve and Spanish sludents in 
Tenerife to sponlaneously genera te and rank order the fea tu res they thought 
would best define "human nature" (Leyens et al., 2000). Judges then coded 
the responses. The number of categories that was generated was quite small, 
and the results from both samples converged closely. The most often cited 
characteristics were, in rank order: Intelligence (reasoning, lhinking), 
Smtimerrt-Semimiemo (or exemplars of that category), and Language 
(communication). Other features were: positive sociability, morality 
(values), and negalive sociability. The word émotiorr-emoción was rarely 
mentioned, and when it was, it appeared at the very end of the lists. 
Intelligence and Language are easy-to-grasp concepts and are under-
standable in all cultures. The terms "Sentiment" in French or "Sentimiento" 
in Spanish, however, are largely specific to Roman languages and cultures, 
and to a lesser extent to Germanic ones. They deserve some explana tion. 
PRIMARY ANO SECONDARY EMOTIONS 
The French term "sentiment" refers to a subcategory of the large concept 
"Emolion". Specifically, "sentiment" is a generic term used to describe 
!hose emotions that are uniquely experienced by human beings. It is 
differentiated from another generic term, "émot.ion", in that the latter refers 
to people's la y conceptions of emotions that humans share with animals. In 
other words, both animals and human beings can experience "émotions", 
whereas "sentiments" are only and uniquely experienced by human beings. 
To validate this distinction, Demoulin, Leyens, Paladino, Rodríguez, 
Rodríguez, and Dovidio (2004, Study 1) conducted a cross-cultural study 
' ! 
! 
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involving lhree counlries (Belgium, Spain, and lhe USA) and four languages 
(English, French, Dutch, and Spanish). Participants received a series of 
emotional lerms and had 10 rate the eJttent to which they were uniquely, or 
non-uniquely human. Moreover, they had to ra1e these same words on a 
series of characteristics. Results across languages were highly convergen!. 
lnterestingly, uniquely human emotions were perceived as less intense, less 
visible, and less externally caused than non-uniquely human emotions. They 
were also rated as appearing la ter in life, as well as more linked to morality 
and cognition. These la y conceptions of emotions bear resemblance to 1he 
scientific lilerature on emotions (e.g., Ekman, 1992) and led to the labelling 
of secondary (uniquely human) emotions versus primary (non-uniquely 
human) emotions. Table 1 gives a list of the most typical primary and 
secondary emotions in four languages. The correspondence across languages 
is almost perfect. In addition, Demoulin et al.'s Study 2 (2004) showed that, 
implicitly, s1uden1s associate more secondary emotions with a human 
context than with an animal one. To sum up, 1hese studies verified that 
secondary emotions are linked 10 humanity and that, for la y people, there is 
no clear boundary between lhem and primary emotions, as is the case in the 
scientific taxonomy of emotions (Ekman, 1992). 
INFRA-HUMANISATION OF OUTGROUPS 
Humankind ceases at· the border or the tribe, the linguistic group, even 
somelimes the village; ( .. . ) a greal many of lhese so-called prirnitive 
populalions give lhemselves a name that means "humans" ( ... ) irnplying by 
this lhal other tribes, groups or villages do not share the sarne human virtues-
or evcn nature ( ... ) 
(Lévi·Strauss, 1952/1987, p. 21 ) 
As specified, lay people define human nature with a relatively small set of 
characteristics: lnlelligence, Uniquely Human Emolions, and Language. 
These features are essential lo human nature in the sense that each of 1hem is 
perceived as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for membership in the 
category. In other words, denying 1he possession of only one of these 
characteristics is sufficient to consider others less human than oneself. 
We chose to focus on emotions as an importan! feature of the human 
essence for severa! reasons. First, and most importan!, emotions are less 
likely than intelligence or language to be dependen! on structural relation-
ships between the groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994). lndeed, they are relevant to 
a large range of contexts and situations and are susceptible to being used by 
both dominan! (high·status) and dominated (low-status) groups. Second, 
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TABLE 1 
Most prototypical primary end secondery emotions es a function of tanguage tDemoulin 
et al., 2004, Study 11 
El•glish Dutc!J Span;sh Frt:uclr 
Prototypical primary emotions Surprise Vcrrast Sorpresa Surprisc 
Rage Wocde Rabia Rage 
Anger Boos Enfado Colore 
Pain Pijn Dolor Doulcur 
Pkasurc Plezicr Placer Plaisir 
Happiness Tevredenheid Alegri" Joic 
Fear schrik Miedo Peur 
Prototyp"=al secondary emotions Tendorness Tcderheid Ternura Tendresse 
Lo ve Liefdc Amor Amour 
Hopc Hoop Espera Espérance 
Guilt Sthuld Cull>abilidad Culpabilité 
S heme Besehaamd Ve.rgüenz.a Hontc 
there exists already an ample amount of research demonstrating that 
individuals discriminale between ingroups and outgroups on the basis of 
intelligence (e.g., Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) and language {e.g., Giles 
& Coupland, 1991 ). Third , unlike intelligence and language, emotions are 
not slrongly associated with norms of equity and equality that could activa te 
social desirability concerns (Gaertner & Jnsko, 2001). Finally, the role of 
emolions in prejudice literature has been under-researchcd (Mackie & 
Smith, 2002). 
In the following paragraphs, we outline a series of hypotheses concerning 
the role of uniqucly human emotions for inlergroup relations. After first 
presenting the general hypothesis, we follow with sorne specific hypotheses 
derived from the more general onc. 
General hypothesis 
Given the prevalence of ethnocentrism (e.g., Jahoda, 2002; Sumner, 1 906), 
we predicted that members of high- and low-status groups would 
unconsciously attribute a "more human" essence to their ingroup than to 
(most) outgroups (Leyens el al., 2000). This higher humanity may be 
achieved by claiming a greater amount of any of the main " human nature·· 
characteristics (intelligence, language, and uniquely human emotions) or any 
combination of thern. Groups could think that they are more intelligent , or 
more intelligent and having more uniquely human ernotions than other 
groups. Such a claim for a higher intelligence would be specific of high-
status groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Indeed, it may be hard for most low-
status groups lo imagine that their group is more intelligent than a high-
264 DEMOULIN ET AL 
status group. Accordingly, we expect the low-status members to auribute 10 
themselves a similar leve! of intelligence as the high-status group members. 
However, nothing prevents groups, irrespectivc of their status, from 
unconsciously claiming more uniquely human emotions. 
We ha ve called infra-humanisation the belicfin a "less human essence" of 
outgroups (Leyens et al., 2000). The degree of infra-humanisation through 
secondary emotions has been operationalised in our studies as a greater 
auribution of both positivc and negative secondary emotions to the ingroup 
than to the outgroup. lndeed, when asked to list tbe uniquely human 
characteristics, participants did not specify the de.sirability or acceptability 
of secondary emotions. Primary emotions play the role of control stimuli 
and it is importan! to note that their attributional pauern does not replica te 
that of secondary emotions. Consisten! with our hypothesis, primary 
emotions should be equally distributed between thc ingroup and the 
outgroup since everyone, including animals, has them (Leyens et al., 2000). 
In all experiments presented here, valence andfor desirability of primary and 
secondary emotions was eontrolled. 
lnfra-humanisation is expected to vary with ingroup identification. 
People who do not identify with their group should not feel the need to 
perceive it as essentially superior. These people should not ca re much about 
the appearance of their ingroup, especially relative to other groups. In fact, 
these members could just as well leave lhe ingroup or stay in it for 
opportunistic reasons. However, the more people identify with and feel 
pride towards their ingroup, the more they should be likely to give it a 
superior essence. As Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1999, p. 3) wrote: 
When we distinguish between responses of high and low identifiers, the general 
pattern is that those who feel higbly committed to their ¡roup are more inclined to 
protect their group's image and ·~•rt themselves on behalf or the group. while less 
committed group members are more likely to be concemed with their personal 
image and pursue individual goals. ln this sense, it would seem that high identifiers 
show more solidarity compared to low identifiers .. . 
To sum up, people should attribute more secondary emotions to the 
ingroup than to the outgroup. This pattern will vary as a function of 
ingroup identification. No such pattem is expected for primary emotions as 
they are belicved to be shared with subhuman species and , consequently, are 
unrelated lo human nature. 
Specific hypotheses 
Sorne specific hypotheses can be derived from the general one. According to 
the ínfra-humanisation theory we predict that, when encountering 
secondary emotions among outgroup members, ingroupers will be 
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panicularly attentive to tnis "abnormality". In turn , they will rcact 
negatively towards them because such human emotions are their property. 
Evidence for this reasoning is supported by anthropological observations 
(Jahoda, 1999, 2002; Lévi-Strauss, 1952/ 1987; Sumncr, 1906). These 
observations clearly suggest that sorne societies claim the human nature 
for themselves while they devalue neighbouring tribes to the state of 
animals. In addition, a series of social psychological arguments also support 
this reasoning. 
lf people wanl to reserve the human nature for themselves, the expression 
of secondary emotions is consisten! with their beliefs about tne ingroup, but 
inconsistent with their beliefs about the outgroup. Therefore, people should 
react dilferently lo lhis consisten! and inconsistent information. Specifica lly, 
outgroup members who mention possessing a secondary emotion could be 
reacted to more negalively for violaling lhe less human character of thcir 
group. Several lines of research have indeed shown that behaviours 
disconfirming people's belief about a group generate more negative 
reactions than confirming behaviours (Chaiken & Derlega, 1978; Rudman 
& Glick, 1999). 
Also, following social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), self· 
enhancement at the social level is best accomplished by the adoption of 
strategies that acnieve or maintain a sense of ingroup superiority over the 
outgroup. Consequently, outgroup similarity on the humanity dimension 
can constitute a threat to the positiveness of one's identity (Branscombe, 
Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999), and motívate one to derogare the 
outgroup. Similarly, Brewer's (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory postu· 
lates that the need for distinctiveness is met through inlergroup compar· 
isons. Consequently, outgroup similarity also constitutes a threat to onc's 
need for differentiation nnd could again moti vate one to deroga te outgroup 
members. 
Following this reasoning, secondary emotions should benefit ingroup 
members but have detrimcntal consequences for outgroup members. 
Although the expression of secondary emotions should lead people 10 
perceive individuals as more human than other group members using 
primary ones, we predict that such a use of secondary emotions will ha ve 
dilferential consequences for ingroup and outgroup members. More 
specifically, we expect that ingroup members who express secondary 
emotions will induce more benevolent behaviours on the part of other 
ingroup individuals than will outgroupers using the same expression of 
emotions. 
To sum up, infra-humanisa tion theory predicts that people will be 
reluctant to aecept the presence of secondary emotions in the outgroup. 
Such reluctance will lead to severa! strategies. First, ingroup members will 
avoid associating the outgroup with secondary emotions. Second, when this 
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strategy is impossible, they will underestimate the importante of the 
association between human emotions and outgroup members. Third, when 
encountering the expression of human emotions among outgroup members 
they will be particularly attentive and will react negatively (or less positively) 
towards them. 
Functions of infra-humanisation 
Ata deeper leve! than stereotypes (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Leyens, Yzerbyt, 
& Schadron, 1994), essences are thought to explain differences between 
groups (Yzerbyt ct al., 2000). From this perspective, infra-humanisation of 
outgroups is a sign of distinctiveness between tbe ingroup and the 
outgroups. 1t combines both ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation 
(Leyens et al., 2003). Not only is a more human essence claimed by 1he 
ingroup (ingroup favouritism), but this human essence is also resented when 
shown by outgroup members (outgroup derogation). 
To function optimally, people normally have to be part of sorne 
restrained social groups. That is, individuals need to have contacts with 
persons with whom they ha ve developed privileged relations (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). This need translates into the creation of social ingroups, and 
consequently of social outgroups. This differentiation is not the end of the 
story. 1 ndeed, as social identity theory (Brown, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) 
posits, people also develop· a social identity related to their ingroup, and in 
order to maintain this social identity in a positive light they enter into a 
favourable comparison process with outgroups. This mechanism is marked 
by a preference for the ingroup, or ingroup favouritism bias, and is reHected 
in biased judgements and behaviours lhat give an undue advanlage 10 the 
ingroup (for a review, see Hewstone, Rubín. & Willis, 2002). Rather than a 
direcl attack against the outgroup, more and more researchers now defend 
the idea that what matters in ingroup favouritism is the ingroup itself and , 
specifically, its protection from oulsiders (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasia, 
Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Sears, 1988). 
Not 10 be confounded with ingroup favouritism is the related concept of 
outgroup derogation (Brewer, 1999). lndeed, favouring one's own group is 
not the snme as denigrating the outgroup. lngroup favouritism refers to 
enhancing ingroups by attributing to them or associating them with positive 
characleristics. Outgroup derogation, in contras!, focuses on outgroups and 
the tendency to attribute to them or associate them with negative features. 
lngroup favouritism and outgroup derogation are said lo be relatively 
independent (Brewer, 1999). Although those two processes are closely 
related and often coincide with one another, they do not necessarily do so in 
all situations. Most of the time, outgroup derogation is beller understood as 
a desire 10 offensively protect oneself or one's own group rather Lhan as a 
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desire to primarily harm others (Fein & Spencer, 1997). Derogation is a self-
protect ive function that arises mainly from perceived or real threat. For 
example, Fein and Spencer (1997) have shown that participants who 
received self-threatening information evaluated negatively the members of a 
stereotyped outgroup, and that these negative evaluations were effective in 
restoring participants' self-esteem. 
lnfra-humanisation is not synonymous with mere ingroup favouritism. 
Except for rare cases (e.g., Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), 
ingroup favouritism is always measured explicitly, whereas infra-humanisa-
tion needs to be implicitly operationalised because it is an unconscious 
phenomenon. More importantly, in fra-humanisation and ingroup favouriL-
ism make differential predictions concerning the attributions of primary and 
secondary emotions. Indeed, ingroup favouritism theory suggests that 
emotions should be attributed to groups as a function of their valence, with 
more positive emotions for the ingroup than for the outgroup. Such a 
pattern does not correspond to the operationalisation of infra-humanisation 
that predicts that emotions will be distributed to groups according to their 
human status, with more secondary emotions for the ingroup than for the 
outgroup. Despite these differences, the fact remains that infra-humanisa-
tion of the outgroup serves the same function as ingroup favouritism. Both 
processes aim at providing the ingroup with a positive image. 
Also, infra-humanisation is not to be confounded with outgroup 
derogation as classically measured in social psychological experiments (for 
a review, see Mummendey & Otten, 1998). Participants in infra-humanisa-
tion experiments do not realise that they harm others as they would if they 
had to deliver unpleasant sounds, negative evaluations, attributes, or 
stereotypes. If ingroup favouritism could be measured by the amount of 
positive emotions attributed to the ingroup, outgroup derogation could be 
tallied by the number of negative emotions assigned to outgroups. Again 
this operationalisation does twt correspond to infra-humanisation, which 
expects more negative secondary emotions for the ingroup than for 
outgroups. Also, outgroup derogation often needs a conftict of interest 
between groups to emerge (Brewer, 1999). Ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906), at 
the basis of infra-humanisation, does not postulate such a condition. 
Outgroup derogation, however, shares with infra-humanisation the desire to 
pre-emptively protect the ingroup, as if the best forrn of defence was offence. 
Relations with some theories 
System-justiflcation tlteory. Our central hypothesis is in li ne with system-
justification theory (for a review, see Jost & Hunyady, 2002) when it applies 
to high-status groups, but it may appear to contradict this theory in the case 
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oflow-status groups. System-justification theory predicts the justification of 
the cllisting social order by high- and low-status groups "in spite of the 
obvious psychological and material harm they entail for disadvantaged 
individuals and groups" (Jost & Banaji , 1994, p. JO; but see Reynolds, 
Turner, & Haslam, 2000; Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). The evidence for 
system justification comes mainly from studies involving stereotypes. Our 
bypothesis, however, is not concerned with more or less accurate stereotypes 
but with the belief in a superior "essence". People may admit that tbeir 
group is lazier and less skilled, and still believe that this group has sorne 
unique and deep superiority. As a South American immigrant told us: "1 
k.now that we are poor, unemployed, witbout upertise and good education. 
Still , l feel that we bave something you do not have." 
Many studies conducted by Jost and bis colleagues (see Jost & Hunyady, 
2002) u sed the stereotype "intelligent", and low-status participants 
recognised that they were less intelligent than higher-status group. This 
finding is not unique to system-justification theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). Because "intelligence" is a uniquely human feature, such a finding 
seems to contradict infra-humanisation. Later in this ·chapter, we will argue 
that this apparent contradiction is an experimental artifact in which 
intelligence means leve! of education, or competence. For ellample, in many 
of Jost's studies, intelligence is linked to skill and bard work. We will show 
that the same results are not obtained when interpretation of "intelligence" 
is left to the respondents: 
Social identity theory. lnfra-humanisation "theory" is much less 
encompassing than social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981). However, it bears 
many similarities with the premises of this theory. Like social identity 
theory, it presupposes that the superiority of the ingroup will often, but not 
always, be claimed. The fact that outgroup favouritism is sometimes 
observed witb minimal groups in the laboratory (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 
1992) does not contradict infra-humanisation; groups may be generous 
towards others and still believe that they ha ve a more human essence. 
After having compared their group with other ones, group members will 
often react as a function of this comparison. Social ident.ity theory entertains 
various hypotheses about these reactions given different parameters 
(legitimacy, stability, and permeability). Whereas sorne groups will look 
for means of social change, a number of individuals will search for 
individual mobili ty. This differenee in reactions speaks to the identification 
of the members with their ingroup. High identifiers are more likely than low 
identifiers Lo adopt a strategy of social change. Conversely, low identifiers 
will tend lo move upwards as individuals (EIIemers et al., 1999). Our 
reasoning also ellpecls differences of infra-humanisation as a function of 
ingroup ident.ification. 
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Deligitimisation and moral exclusion. Delegitimisation (Bar-Ta l, 1989) 
refers to the fact that sorne social groups are categorised so negatively that 
they are excluded from humankind. Those groups are considered to be 
outside the limits of aooeptable norms andfor values. Beca use outgroupers 
are removed from the domain of moral acceptability (Kelman, 2001 ). 
delegitirnisation gives the moral licence to groups and individuals to harm 
others, and even kili them. This phenomenon bas also been called " moral 
exclusion" (Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). It occurs when "individuals or 
groups are perceived as outside the boundaries in which moral values, rules, 
and considerations of fairness apply. Those who are morally excluded are 
perceived as noncntities, expendable, or uodeserving; consequently, harming 
them appears acceptable, appropriate, or just" (Opotow, 1990, p. 173). 
Althougb infra-humanisation thcory clearly relates to the concepts of 
delegitimisation and moral exclusion, it departs from them on many points. 
First, delegitimisa tion and moral eltclusion theorists clearly restríct 
themselves to extreme forms of outgroup derogation and aggression such 
as genocide, negative eugenics, war, etc. These silUations involve intense 
conflicts between groups an¡j are associated with explicit negative altitudes 
and behaviours towards outgroup members. The infra·humanisation theory 
(Leyens et al., 2000), in cootrast, refers to relatively normal intergroup 
situatioos. In other words, our research programme attempts to assess infra· 
humanisation biases in everyday groups' evaluations. Second, whereas 
delegitimisation and moral exclusion are closer to what one could cal! 
"dehumanisation" (that is, the idea that others are no Jonger human beings 
or no longer pertain lO tbe human specfi:s), Leyens el al. (2000) ÍnSÍSt On 
using the softer term or "infra-humanisation", implying lesser humanity. 
While dehumanisation is invoked to explain extreme behaviours such as 
ethnocides, infra-humanisa tion takes into account mi lder forms of 
discrimination. Finally, infra-humanisation theory does not restrict itself 
to the (non-) attribution or morality to the groups. lndeed, as we have 
shown in this revicw, infra-humanisation of outgroup members can be 
achieved through other uniquely human features such as intelligence, 
language, or seeondary emotions. 
To sum up. we propose to conceptualise "humanity" as a continuum (sec 
Demoulin et al., 2004) rather than an exclusive category. Our preference for 
"infra-humanisa tion". over other expressions such as "dehumanisation" or 
"animalisation" is reftexive of this continuum hypothesis. Delegitimisa tion 
or moral exclusion as observed in extremely confticting situations could be 
considered a particular case with.in the broader infra-bumanisation 
perspective. In other words, the tendcncy to infra-humanise others occurs 
implicitly in everyday intergroup situations and would reach its paroxysm in 
delegitimisation and moral exclusion, when others are explicitly rejected 
from the human catcgory. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIOENCE 
The remainder of this chapter will be divided into four sections. In the first 
part, we offer evidence of tbe general hypothesis that infra-humanisation is a 
greater attribution of secondary emotions to the ingroup than to outgroups. 
In the second part, we demonstrate that ingroup members react negatively 
to the expression of secondary emotions by outyoup members. In the third 
part, we summarise studies that show behavioural consequences of the use 
of secondary emotions by ingroup and outgroup members. In each section, 
various paradigms with different sets of secondary and primary emotions are 
used to ascertain generalisability. Also, the positive and negative valence or 
desirability of the two kinds of emotions has always been controlled for. 
Finally, the conclusion summarises the present slate of infra-humanisation 
theory, discusses its limitations and remaining problems, and suggests new 
lines of research in relation to well-established theories. 
INGROUPS HAVE MORE SECONDARY EMOTIONS 
THAN OUTGROUPS 
In this section. we examine the general hypothesis that both positive and 
negative secondary emotions are more often attributed to, or associated 
with, the ingroup than the outgroup regardless of the respective status of 
these groups. In as muchas infra-humanisation does not postula te a conflict 
between groups to appear, it was also necessary to test groups varying in 
their deyee of (non)conHicting relations. Finally, infra-humanisation rests 
on the assumption that differences between groups are explained by 
"essences" and that the differential reactions to ingroup and outgroup will 
depend on the degree of ingroup identillcation. 
Differential associations 
In an initial series of experiments (Paladino, l..eyens, Rodriguel, Rodriguez., 
Gaunt, & Demoulin. 2002), we wanted to test the differential as.sociation of 
primary and secondary emotions with different ingroups and ou tgroups. 
Towards this aim, we used the well-known lmplicit Association Task 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), which has often been used to test 
implicit racism. The test usually consists of five phases; three practice phases 
and two experimental phases. In one of the experimental phases 
("compatible task"), participants have to press a given key as quickly as 
possible when they see on the screen of their computer an ingroup name and 
11 positive word, and another key when they see an outgroup name and a 
negative word. In the other phase ("incompatible task"), participants have 
to rcact to ingroup names and negative words with one key. and to outgroup 
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names and pos111ve words with aoother key. Participants generally react 
more quickly on the compatible task, and the dilference in the reaction times 
between the compatible task and the incompatible task serves asan index of 
implicit racism. We replaced the positive and negative words with secondary 
and primary emotions, respectively. The compatible task thus involved 
iogroup - secondary vs outgroup-primary emotions, whereas the incompa-
tible task involved ingroup- primary vs outgroup- secondary emotions. 
Four studies were conducted using different ingroups (Spanish people for 
the Canary Jslands, French-speaking Belgians), different outgroups (Magh-
rebis, Dutch-speaking Belgians), dilferent protolypical positive primary and 
secondary emotions, and different prototypical negative primary and 
secondary emotions. lndependently of these variations, reaction times in 
compatible tasks were consistently and significantly faster than in 
incompatible tasks. The magnitude of the índices and the different effect 
sizes indicated that the participants associa ted the ingroup more strongly 
with secondary emotions and the outgroup with primary emotions than the 
reverse (see Table 2). 
Differential attributions 
The Jmplicit Association Task does not allow us to single out which 
association is responsible for the difference be1ween the compatible and 
incompatible tasks. Leyens et al. 's (2000) hypothesis, however, predicts that 
the effect should be obtained on the secondary emotions beca use they are 
uniquely associated to the human dimension. To address this question, 
Leyens el a l. (200 l , Expts l & 2) conducted two studies. We summarise one 
of them here (Expt. 2). After having answered a questionnaire about thcir 
identification wi th their region, "Canarians" from the Canary lslands (low-
sta tus group) and "Peninsulars" from main land Spain (high-status group) 
received a list of 26 words comprising positive and negative primary and 
secondary emotions. the words "talent" and "intelligence", as well as 1-illers 
TABLE 2 
Responses speed (msJ to compatible and incompatible tasks of the lmplicit Associalion 
Task and effecl sizes !Paladino et al.. 20021 
Jugroup Outgroup e ompm ;b/(• /11( '0UI(Wfih/t• " 
Belgion Nonh-African 826 883 .66 
Spunish Norlh-African 759 noo .67 
Oelgian NorJh-African 802 &75 .85 
Belgian French-speaking Bclgian Flemish·speaking 1086 124~ 1.05 
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consisting of positive and negative traits linked to competence and warmth 
(Giick & Fiske, 1999) that were not linked lo uniquely human character-
istics. Half of the participants were asked to select about 12 characteristics 
that were typical of their ingroup, while the others responded for the 
outgroup. Canarians and Peninsulars have a history of mild conflicting 
relations and they stereotype each other according 10 Fiske and colleagues' 
competence/warmth dimensions (1999). In other words, Canarians, the low-
status group, are peroeived as sociable but incompetent, and Peninsulars are 
stereotyped as competen! but not sociable (Quiles, Leyens, & Rodríguez, 
2001). 
Consisten! with the infra-humanisation hypothesis, there was neither a 
main effect of status nor any significan! interaction involving this variable. 
Both low- and high-status participants attributed significantly more 
secondary emotions lo their ingroup than to the outgroup (see Figure 
1 ). This result was independent of the valence of secondary emotions. 
Primary emotions were distributed evenly between the groups. Consisten! 
with infra-humanisation theory, Canarians evaluated themselves as just as 
intelligent as the outgroup. Unsurprisingly, Peninsulars attributed much 
more intelligence to themselves than to Canarians. In other words, the 
high-status group infra-humanised others on both the intelligence and the 
uniquely human emotions, whereas the low-status group infra-humanised 
solely the outgroup on t~e uniquely human emotion dimension. As stated 
earlier, one should form the habit of disentangling the uniquely human 
term " intelligence" from other non-uniquely competence-related traits, 
2 
1,8 
1,6 
1,4 
1.2 
1 
0,8 
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0,4 
0,2 
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PosHJve 
• tngroup 
Ooutaroun 
No¡¡otlvo 
Figure l. Mean number or positive and negative secondary emotions attributed to the ingroup 
und to the outgroup (Leyens et al .• 2001, Study 2). 
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which are not always positively connoted. lndeed, the high-status group 
perceived itself as more posiúvely competent, but interestingly it was 
described by the outgroup as positively (c.g., bard working) and negativcly 
(e.g., calculaúng) competen!. Unsurprisingly, the low-status group 
members saw themselves and were seen by others as more positively 
sociable. 
Preference for ingroup-secondary emotions 
associations 
To verify that infra-humanisation was not dependen! on a particular design, 
we tested it with the Wason Selection Task (Wason, 1968). The Wason 
Selection Task traditionally measures deductive reasoning. In the most well-
known version of the task, parúcipants see four cards (E, K, 4, 7) and they 
are told that each card has a number on one side and a Jetter on the other. 
Their task is to turn the card(s) needed to verify the truth of the rule: " lf 
there is a vowel on one side, then there must be an even number on the other 
side". No more than 10% of participan !S are able to logically sol ve the task 
(by selecting E and 7). Earlier research (Scaillet & Leyens, 2000) also 
demonstrated that when social information is contained in the rules, pcople 
do not consider the logical status of the cards but take into account the 
content of this social information. For instance, when given one of the four 
rules "lf ingroup (vs outgroup), then positive (vs negative) trait", most 
persons select ingroup and positive trait, regardless of the rule. 
In four studies we used tbe Wason Selection Task to implicitly test 
participants' preference for the pair "ingroup - secondary emotions" 
(Demoulin et al., 2002b). Each participan! received one of the four possible 
rules: " lf ingroup (outgroup) member, then sj he feels .. . exemplar of 
primary (secondary) emotioo". Jn one study, participants had to sclect 
two cards. In the otber tbree studies, four pairs of cards (ingroup- primary 
emotion; ingroup-secondary emotion; outgroup-primary emotion; out-
group- secondary emotion) were presented to the participants and they had 
lo select the pair they thought was most important for solving the rule. 
Depending on tbe study, the ingroups (Canarians, Frencb-speaking 
Belgians, US citizens) and outgroups (Peninsulars, French, Dutch-speaking 
Belgians, and Mexicans) varied as well as the positive and negative 
emotions. Canarians and Frencb-speaking Belgians hada lower status than 
their outgroup, Peninsulars, French, and Dutch-speaking Belgians, respec-
tively. In contrast, East Coast Amerícans hada higher status than Mexicans. 
lo two cases there was no conftict between the groups (French-speaking 
Belgians vs French, and East Coast Amerícans vs Mexicans). In the other 
two cases there were mild coofticting relations. Canarians resent the 
threatening presence of Peninsulars on their islands (Quiles et al., 2001) and 
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Belgium is known for its linguistic conflicts, although .nowadays these 
conflicts exist mainly at the política! leve!. 
As eJtpected, people cbose the ingroup- secondary emotion pair 
significantly more ofien (in 29% of cases) than the outgroup-secondary 
emotion pair (19%). Also as predicted, there was no difference for the 
selection pairs involving a primary emotion. Whcn looking.separately at the 
different studies, all of them presented a significant difference between the 
two secondary emotion pairs, eJtcept for the study involving Belgian ingroup 
(French-speaking) and outgroup (Dutch-speaking). In this last case, the 
means went in the right direction but the difference did not attain the 
conventional leve! of significance. Remember, howevcr, that with thc 
Implicit Association Task (Paladino et al., 2002), French-speaking Belgians 
discriminated against Dutch-speaking Belgians. 
The results of these studies are particularly importan\. First, they 
replicate the finding that both low- and high-status groups claim to have 
a more human essence titan outgroups. Second, and importantly, conflict 
between groups seems not to be neccssary for infra-humanisation to 
occur. The latter result is' congruent with social identity theory research. 
Very often (see Mullen et al., 1992), an ingroup favouritism bias has 
been found on the basis of mere categorisation, that is, in the absence of 
conflict between groups. Such a result is more difficult to explain from 
an outgroup derogation perspective. Outgroup derogation is generully 
found in the case of conflict (Brewer, 1999) or when the outgroup is 
dislíked (Fein & Spencer, 1997). However, classical studies on outgroup 
derogation (see Brewer, 1999) have always involved dependent variables 
that were potentially harmful for outgroups, and that had to be 
delivered consciously by the participants. We will come back to this 
problem later. 
Fam iliarity as an a lternativa explanation 
Beca use secondary emotions cannot be observed as easily on sorneone's face 
as primary emotions (Demoulin el al., 2004; Shaver, Wu, & Schwarz, 1992). 
one could argue that the differentiated results for ingroup and outgroup are 
in fact dueto an artifact of such emotioos. lndeed, beca use of the familiarity 
shared with the significan\ others who form the ingroup (Andersen & Cole, 
1990), it is plausible that people ha ve more eltperience reading emotions of 
ingroup members than of outgroup members (Prentice, 1990). lf it is the 
case that attribution of secondary emotions is mediated by familiarity, this 
would also imply that the self should receive (or be attributed) more 
secondary emotions 1han lhe ingroup. lndeed, we would then observe a 
linear pattern of attribulion growing from the outgroup, 10 the ingroup. 10 
the self. 
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To test this hypothesis, Cortes, Demoulin, Rodríguez, Rodríguez. and 
Leyens (in press) asked Canarian participants to complete the samc 
attribution task as the one used by Leyens el al. (200 1, Expt. 2). Depending 
on the condition, participants made the attributions either to themselves, or 
to the ingroup (Canarians), or to the outgroup (Peninsulars). Contrary to 
what the familiarity hypothesis would predict, attributions of secondary 
emotions to the self were not higher than attributions to the ingroup. 
Significantly more secondary emotions were attributed to the ingroup tha11 
to the self and to the self than to the outgroup. These differences did 1101 
interact with valence. As found before, the three targets were attributed 
similar degrees of primary emotions. 
In this experiment, the participants were tested in a between-participants 
design for consistency with the type of design we had used before. 
Classically, familiarity research al the interpersonal leve! (e.g., McGuire & 
McGui re, 1988; Prentice, 1990) uses within-participant designs with 
ditferent targets. Presumably, the direct comparison of different targets 
allows a more pronounced test of familiarity. Also, the shift from a 
between-participants design to a within-participant 011e may change the 
meaning afforded to the self. Most probably, the part of the self that was 
activated in the between-participant design was a personal one. In an 
intergroup context, social identi ty theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests 
that people rely on that part of themselves concerned with their group 
membership (i.e., the ingroup) to make eva luations; that is, their social 
identity. Would the above results be replicated if the self were presented in a 
group context? Cortes et al. (in press) replicated the a hove· experiment but 
this time in a mixed design . Two within-participants conditions were 
created. In the first condition, participants had to attribute the traits and 
emotions to their ingroup (Canarians) and to the self. In the sccond 
condition, participants attributed traits and emotions to the ougroup 
(Peninsulars) and to the self. The order of attributions was controlled in 
both conditions but did 1101 ha ve any effect. Cont rary to the findings for the 
between-participants experiment, allri butio11s of secondary emotions were 
the same for the self and for the ingroup. lmportantly, participants 
attribu ted many more secondary emotio11s to themselves than to the 
outgroup. Finally, in neither the ingroup -self nor the outgroup-self 
conditions did the results of primary emotions d iffer depending 011 the 
target of attribution. 
Altogether, results of these two experiments suggest that familiarity is 
probably not the best mediator of secondary emotions' attributions. 
However, one cannot totally exclude some familiarity effects. Further 
experiments that manipulate the degree of familiarity with the targets a re 
still needed in order to specify the cxact impact, if any, of this variable on the 
attribution process. 
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lngroup identification: Moderator and mediator of 
infra-humanisation 
Ingroup identification should play a crucial role in infra-humanisation. 
Individuals who barely identify with their ingroup should not be prone to 
infra-humanise outgroup members. lndeed, if one belongs to a group with 
which one barely identifies, one's social identity is not at stake and there is 
no need to feel that this ingroup possesses more human essence than 
outgroups. The role of identification was examined in a series of studies. The 
more people will identify with their ingroup the more they should be prone 
to C)(hibit the tendency to infra-humanise outgroup members. 
We asked British students to answer a scale of identification with their 
country (Viki, raw data). The items were adapted from Ellemers and 
collcagues (Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Kortekaas & 
Ouwerkerk, 1999). Participants then received a list comprising 12 stimulus 
words: 4 were positive secondary emotions, 4 were positive primary 
emotions, and 4 were t.raits linked to competence and "warmth". All 
participants were asked to describe Britain and Germany, in counter· 
balanced order, by selecting typical words for each gro u p. lt should be noted 
that the target outgroup was not neutral to the participants. In general, there 
appears to be sorne competitive animosity between British and German 
citizens, which sometinÍes erupts into violenoe (e.g., during national team 
football matches; Abrams & Hutchison, 2002). Participants were cate· 
gorised as low and high identifiers. Only high identitiers showed infra-
humanisation towards Germans (see also Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer. & 
Leyens, 2002). The order of the target.s was nonsignificant. 
Germans were also evaluated as the outgroup for ltalian students by 
Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, and Leyens (in press). In this study, 
participants described Halians and Germans. The ordcr had no effect. 
Afterwards, they answered a 5-item scalc of identification with ltaly. Figure 
2 shows that the more the l talian students identified with their ingroup, the 
more they allributed secondary emotions to the ingroup. lngroup 
identification had no effect on the outgroup description. Moreover, the 
more the participants iden tified with the ingroup, the more they tended to 
attribute prirnary emotions to the outgroup. Conversely, identification had 
no effect on the allribution of primary emotions to the ingroup. 
These results reveal that belonging to the ingroup is insufficient to 
produce· infra-humanisation bias. People's ingroup identity has lo be at 
stake in order to produce thc bias. 
lnfra-humanisation depends on both ingroup identification and the 
meaningfulness of the categories for the participants. Specitically, for the 
bias to occur, both social identity and subjective essentialism are needed 
such that group categorisation is perceived as meaningful. These ideas 
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ldentiflcation to the group 
---ingroup • • • outgroup 
Flcuro 2. ldentilication and attribution ofS«<ndary emotionsto the ingroup (ltalians) and the 
outarou¡> (Gennans) (Paladino <l o. l., in prc:ss). 
further delinea te the difference between the "classic ingroup bias" (occurring 
in strict minimal group situations, e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 
1971) and "infra-huma!lisation" (occurring to the extent lhal groups are 
perceived as essentially differenl from one anolher and thal group members 
idcnlify wilh lheir ingroup, leyens el al., 2000). 
In the research summarised up to lhis point , 1he groups studied were 
regional or national. We 1ook for granted that lhey had an importan! 
meaning for the parlicipants and lhal lheir "naluralness" induced 
essenlialisation. We nevcr lesled lhese assumptions. 
To verify the importance of the meaningfulness of the calegories for 
infra-humanisalion, we (Demoulin el al., 2002a) used the minimal group 
paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971) in a between-panicipants design, wilh lhree 
levcls of meaningfulness of the categorisation criterion. Small groups of 
psychology participants were divided using one of three melhods: on a 
random basis, by lheir prcfcrence for a given colour, or by their choice 10 
work with children or adults in 1heir future career. After they had made their 
choice, parlicipants in the Colour and Work condilions were asked to spend 
5 minutes thinking and writing down what was uniquc aboul their group. 
Parlicipants in the Random condition had 10 write down what lhey 1hough1 
about the impacl of wasles on lhe environment. 
Dependen! measures included infra-humanisation (number of positive 
secondary emolions selected in a list, cf. Leyens et al. , 2001, Expts. 1 & 2) 
278 DEMOULIN ET AL 
and the "classic ingroup bias" {allocation of points to groups according to 
the Tajfel matrices). In addition, measures of ingroup identification as well 
as groups' perceived essentialism (Haslam et al., 2000) were introduced in 
the design to test whetber these two variables mediated the effect of category 
meaningfulness on infra-humanisation biases. The results strongly sup-
ported our predictions. First, infra-humanisation was absent in the non-
meaningful condition and present in the meaningful ones. Second, both 
identification and groups' essentialisation mediated the effect of the 
conditions on infra-humanisation (see Figure 3). Third, the classic ingroup 
bias was found in all conditions and to an equal degree. Moreover, the way 
people allocated points to lhe groups was uncorrelated with the way they 
attributed secondary emotions to these groups. 
To sum up, mere categorisation is insufficient to produce infra-
humanisation. Infra-humanisation rcquires meaningful categories and the 
impact of the categorisation's criterion is mediated by both ingroup 
identification and groups' essentialisation. This latter study also highlights 
the fact that infra-humanisation is not equivalen! to the classic ingroup bias, 
even though there are common goals. 
A 
Condition 
B • 
Condition 
Entitative 
Essentialism 
.30• 
(.18) 
lngroup 
ldent.ification 
.Jo• 
(.11) 
.29• 
(.24•) 
.36* 
(.32*) 
Infra-humanization 
Infra-humanizat.ion 
figure 3. Mediational analyses. Coefficients in parentheses are corrccted coefficients resuhing 
from muhiple rcgressio ns. (Demoulin el al., 2002a). 
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Summary 
This first section testifies that low- and high-status groups infra-humanise 
outgroups by auributing to them less secondary emotions (both positive and 
negative) than to themselves. Interestingly, and consisten! with the theory 
based on ethnocentrism, conflicting relations betweén groups do not seem to 
be a necessary condition for theoccurrence ofinfra-humanisation (Demoulin, 
Leyens, Rodríguez, Rodríguez, Paladino, & Fiske, 2002b; Paladino et al., 
2002). Beca use secondary emotions are less intense and visible than primary 
ones, one could ha ve argued that the differential attribution of emotions was 
dueto familiarity. This does not seem to be the case (Cortes et al., in press). 
lngroup identification plays an importan! role in the infra-humanisation 
bias (Demoulin et al., 2002a; Paladino et al. , in press; Yiki, raw data). The 
premises of the infra-humanisation thcory expected such role. Indeed, ooly 
members who care for their group should show ethnocentrism. Essentialisa-
tion of the groups was tested in one study (Demoulin et al., 2002a) and found 
to mediate infra-humaoisation. Such a result supports the reasoning behind 
infra-humanisation but further studies are needed to verify its reliability. 
Of relevance to system-justification theory (Jost & Hunyady, 2002), it was 
interesting to find that members of low-status groups recognised the positive 
and negative aspects of the superior competence of outgroup members, but 
claimed the same level of intelligence. Such a finding has always been 
replicated in the studies using a list of emotional terms and fillers about 
competence, sociability, and intelligence. lt is of utmost importance for our 
theory because intelligence constitutes a uniquely human characteristic. 
RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT SECONDARY 
EMOTIONS AMONG OUTGROUPS 
l f people uoconsciously consider that their ingroup has a more human 
essence than outgroups and consequently possesses a greater number of 
secondary emotions, they should be especially vigilant about the possibility 
that these outgroups show secondary emotions (AIIport & Kramer, 1946). 
Not only will they be vigilan!, they will also avoid associations between 
secondary emotions and outgroups, and underestimate the amount of such 
emotions in outgroups. The following studies tested these hypotheses. 
Controlling non-desired associations 
If people resent that outgroup members possess secondary ernotions, they 
should carefully attend to any association between outgroup and secondary 
emotions (Smith, 1998, but see also Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Stated 
otherwise, people should have a better-controlled memory for outgroup 
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secondary emotion tban for ingroup secondary emotion. To test tbis 
hypothesis, we (Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 2002) used Jacoby's (1991) 
process-dissociation procedure. With this procedure, participants in the 
"inclusion" condition are required to include certain items in the "old" 
category, whereas participants in the "exclusion" condition are required not 
to include those items. If participants are as likely to callan item "old" when 
instructed to as when instructed not to, this implies that they ha ve exerted 
no control over their recognition memory. Conversely, the larger the 
dilference in performance between the two conditions, the more intentional 
and controlled is the participants' memory. 
In the first stage, Belgian participants solved anagrams lhat involved 
associations between the ingroup (Belgjans) or the outgroup (Arabs) and 
either primary or secondary emotions. In the second stage, participants 
listened to a list of similar items. Finally, in the third stage, a recognition 
memory test was given. The test included items that were presented as 
ahagrams in the first stage, items that were heard in the second stage, and 
new items that participants had never encountered. The anagrams were to 
be called "old" in the inclusion condition and "new" in the exclusion one. 
The dilference between the probability of calling an anagram "old" in the 
inclusion condition minus the probability of calling an anagram "old" in the 
exclusion condition served as a dependen! measure of the exerted control on 
memory. As shown in Table 3, the results fully confirmed the hypothesis. 
Participants exerted much more control over associations between 
secondary emotions and the outgroup than over any other associations 
and, therefore, memorised these associations to a greater extent. 
Avoiding outgroup - secondary emotion 
associations 
When we (Demoulin et al., 2002b) used the Wason Selection Task (see 
above), we not 'only asked French·speaking Belgians (vs Frencb and Dutch· 
speaking Belgians) and Americans (vs Mexicans) to select the most 
importan! pair of cards to solve the task , we also asked for the least 
importan! pair. A total of 35% of participants selected the outgroup -
secondary pair as the least importan! one, against only 20% who opted for 
the ingroup - secondary emotion pair. Again, there was no ditference 
between the two pairs that involved primary emotions. Whereas the results 
of the French-speaking Belgians versus Dutch·speaking Belgians were not 
significan! for the most importan! pair, they were significan! for the least 
importan! pair. In fact, they were significan! for all three studies, and 
stronger than those for the preference of the ingroup- secondary emotion 
pair. This suggests that people are ·especially reluctant to associate outgroup 
members with characteristics that they believe to be their property. 
IV 
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TABLE 3 
Probabilities of col ling an anagram "old" in !he inclusion and exclusion conditions IGaunt et al.. 2002) 
Stogt 1 
Stcondar;11 'motionJ 
Ou1group 
.719(SD= .137) 
.175(SD •.166) 
lngroup 
.526 (SD = .195) 
.268 (SD = .2JO) 
Primar.v tmotiDttS 
Outgroup 
.640 (SD = .237) 
.231 (SD = .222) 
/ugroup 
.701 (SD = .181) 
.194 (SD • .183) 
Stage 2 (0/d) 
.585 (SD = .169) 
.666 (SD = . 126) 
Sroge1 (N .. •J 
.236 (SD • .131) 
.291 (SD = .201) 
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Underestimating the outgroup's secondary 
emotions 
The preceding studies have used various emotions as dependen! measures. 
However, to avoid thecriticism that the findings weredue to the use ofspecific 
eltemplars of primary and secondary emotions, and to further generalise our 
theory, we {Leyens et al., 2001 , Eltpt. 3) opted for the use ofa paradigm that 
did not involve exemplars of specific valence. The procedure was adapted 
from Krueger, Rothbart, and Sriram's studies (1989). Canarian participants 
had to calcula te on-line the cumulative means of each of two sets of numbers. 
The distributions of these sets of numbers were such that fewer errors should 
occur for the first halfthan for the second half. One ofthe twosets ofnumbers 
was associated with the ingroup (Canarians) and the other with the outgroup 
(Peninsulars). Moreover, three betwcen-participants conditions were created 
in which participants were told that the numbers represented the levels of 
calcium, of primary emotions (emoción), or of secondary emotions 
(sentimiento) of the two groups. Befo re starting their calculation, participants 
were shown lists of primary emotioos, or of secondary emotions, or of foods 
containing much calcium. Calcium was thougbt to be symbolically neutral for 
participants and played the role of control condition. We predicted that the 
final means for calcium and primary emotions would not differ as a function 
of the groups. Conversely, and in line with the infra-humanisation 
hypothesis, we hypothesised that the estima tes of secondary emotions would 
be greater for the ingroup than for the outgroup. Results confirmed the 
general hypotheses. The difference between the means for Canarians and 
Peninsulars was significan! only in the case of secondary emotions. Moreover, 
when compared to the means obtained for primary emotions and calcium, the 
results show a significan! difference only for the outgroup. Stated otherwise, 
both groups differ in terms of secondary emotions but this difference is 
essentially due to the low amount attributed to the outgroup. 
This summary may give the impression that participants simply 
attributed a higher number for the secondary emotions of the iogroup than 
for the outgroup. However, the procedure, (too complelt to be related here, 
see Leyens et al., 2001, Eltpt. 3; al so Krueger et al., 1989), prevents such a 
simple interpretation. Let us just say here that during the first phase, when 
errors are rare, no difference was obtained in the different conditions. Even 
though no exemplar of emotioos was provided, the final result indica tes once 
more a reluctance to attribute secondary emotions to the outgroup. 
Summary 
In this section, we attempt.ed to test whether or not people are unconsciously 
reluctant to accept that outgroup members also ha ve or may ha ve secondary 
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emotions. The results obtained in a number of studies seem to indica te that 
this is the case. 
When confronted with outgroup-secondary emotions associations, 
people's attention is drawn to these associations and they remember them 
more consciously than ingroup-secondary emotions ones (Gaunt et al., 
2002). Presumably, the ditference in the control of memory is dueto the fact 
that outgroup- secondary emotions are incongruous with beliefs concerning 
-outgroups, whereas this is not the case for the ingroup (Leycns et al., 2001, 
Expt. 3). Also, when they have the choice to associate the ingroup or the 
outgroup with secondary emotions, the latter option is selected as the leasl 
importan! resource (Demoulio et al., 2002b). Individuals tend to avoid , as 
much as possible, the association of the outgroup with secondary emotions. 
When objective reality imposes such associations, their frequency is 
underestimated (Leyens et al., 2001 , Expt. 3; see al so Gaunt, Sindic, & 
Leyens, in press). All these results suggest once again that people tend to 
consider secondary emotions the exclusive property of their ingroup. 
WHEN INGROUP ANO OUTGROUP EXPRESS 
SECONDARY EM OTIONS 
This section examines people's reactions towards ingroup vs outgroup 
members expressing themselvcs with primary vs secondary emotions. 
Consisten! with the theory, it is hypothesised that the use of secondary 
emotions by ingroup and outgroup members should lead to differential 
reactions on the part of the responden!. Specifically, whereas the use of 
secondary emotions will result in positive consequences for ingroup 
members, tbe use of secondary emotions by an outgroup member will 
induce opposite reactions. In contrast, primary emotions, being nondiag-
nostic of the human category, should not induce differentíal reactions as a 
function of the expresser's group membership. 
Pro-social reactions and secondary emotíons 
Beca use the use of secondary ínstead of primary emotions reflects, at least 
implicítly, the degree of humanity of a person, one could argue that the 
common humanity wíll promete prosocíal attitudes and behavíours towards 
the user. We tested this hypothesis (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli , Leyens, & 
Giovanazzí, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002). Specífically, we uscd the 
lost-email paradigrn (Castellí, Zogmaister, & Arcuri, 2001b; Stern & Faber, 
1997) to examine prosocial behavíours and altitudes when people are 
confronted with an ingroup member's message startíng wíth eíther a primary 
ora secondary ernotion. An emaíl asking for scientific help and directed to a 
specific researcher was sent to hundreds of incorrect addrcsses (i.e., other 
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persons than this specific researcher). The content of the answers signalling 
the error to tbe sender constituled 1he dependen! measure (the frequencies of 
1he informal pronoun "tu"-in old Englisb "thou"-and of the formal 
pronoun "vous"-in old English "ye"). Consisten! with our hypothesis, 
secondary emotion messages, compared to primary emotion ones, provoked 
" nicer" responses . We argue that ingroup members who express themselves 
in terms of secondary emotions are seen as more human and, consequently, 
influence people's adoption of more altruistic behaviours. 
The finding that secondary emotions elicit prosocial altitudes is 
encouraging but insuflicient . l ndeed, one has 10 verify whether the increase 
in prosocial altitudes also appears to be true when it is an outgroup member, 
rather than an ingroup one, who expresses him/herself wilh secondary 
emotions. In a second series of experiments, we crossed primary and 
secondary emotion messages with category membership of the sender (Vaes 
el al., 2003, Expt. 1). The sender was either a university researcher 
'(ingrouper) ora researcher worlcing for a prívate firm (outgrouper) and the 
participants were all working in Belgian universities. Because humanity is 
reflecled by the use of secondary emotions, we hypolhesised thal nicer 
responses would be directed towards ingroupers compared to outgroupers. 
This pattern· of responses should not appear for primary emotions, since 
these emotions do not reflect one's humanity. Results confirmed the 
hypotheses (see Table 4). The use of secondary emotions, compared to 
primary ones, in crea sed· solidarity responses towards an ingrouper and 
decreased those responses towards an outgroup member. 
Perspective taking 
We followed the same reasoning as above concerning perspective taking 
(Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, in press). Perspective talcing refers to 1he 
TABLE 4 
Mean solidarity scores as a lunclion ol sender's group membershlp and type ol emotion 
e•pressed tVaes et al., 2003, Study 1 J. 
Prúnary t.nrotion ~rondar¡ rmoJion 
lngroup (univenity momber) M - 0.96., - o.ts. 
so 1.43 1.19 
N 2~ 28 
Ouc¡roup (priva te workcr) M - 0.67, - 1.1 3. 
so 1.13 1.14 
N 24 30 
Logical comparison.s (i.c., ••cluding diagonal concrasts) that do not share a common subscripc 
d.iffer al p < .05. 
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capacily lo focus on lhe context of the larget person and to draw on 
contextua) features to infer the perceptions and the inner state of lhis Larget. 
To measure it, we used the draw-an-E-on-your-forehead procedure 
developed by Hass (1984).1 The person whose perspective was to be taken 
belonged either to the ingroup orto an outgroup, and expressed herself with 
secondary or primary emotions. The pattern of results was identical to the 
one obt.ained in the lost-email studies. In other words, participants were 
better at taking the perspective of ingroupers expressing themselves with 
secondary emotions than the perspective of outgroupers expressing 
themselves with the same emotions. 
Conformity to a modal 
To test further the hypothesis that the use of secondary emotions by an 
outgroup member leads lo negative reactions, we investigated the process of 
conformity to a model (Vaes et al., 2003, Expts. 2 & 3). A long research 
tradition has shown that conformity to a model is greatly dependen! on the 
model's characteristics (Mackie & Skelly, 1994) and, specifica lly, lhat liking 
and similarity with the model usually increases conformity (Brock, 1965; 
Milis & Kimble, 1973; Sampson & lnsko, 1964). Given the importan! role of 
similarity in conformity lowards a target, we hypothesised that the use of 
secondary emotions would have a differential impact on conformity as a 
function of group membership (ingroup vs outgroup). Because people are 
motivated lo maintain positive distinctiveness for the ingroup (Brewcr, 
1991) and a psychologieal distance from the outgroup (Branscombe et al., 
1999), induced human similarity through the use of secondary emotions 
should make people more likely to conform wilh an ingroup member and, at 
the same time, less likely to conform 10 an oulgroup member's judgement. 
In lhis sense, similarity should mediate conformity with a model describing 
himself in terms of secondary emotions. This pattern of dilferential 
conformity should not oceur in the case of primary emotions. 
This assertion was examined in two studies (Vaes el al. , 2003, Expts. 2 & 
3). Both experiments assessed conformity to a 1arget using an adapted 
version of Castelli et al. 's conformity paradigm (Castelli, Vanzetto, Shcrman. 
& Arcuri, 200la). ltalian parlicipants had to form an impression of an 
ingroup targel (Marco, an ltalian) oran outgroup targel (Almad, a Nigerian) 
who described his past week mainly in terms of primary or secondary 
1The Drnw-an-E-on-your-forehead proccdure was developed to mensure people's lendenties 
to take unothcr person's penpectivc. Specifically, panicipants are rcque:ned to draw lln "1}'' on 
lheir forthead. lf lhe person takes 1he perspeclive of the observcr. lhen s/he should wrilc lhe 
teuer lhe Olher way arouod (i.e., "3"), such that lhe observer can easily read iL tf lhe person 
docs not IJ ke the perspective of lhe obsem:r, sfhe should then wrile lhe leller accordin110 her/ 
his own peflpective (i.e., "E"). 
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emotions. In Study 2, participants formed their impression about only one of 
the two targets (ingroup or outgroup) whereas in Study 3 they had to form a n 
impression of both targets. Parti<:ipants performed an unrelated conformity 
task at the same time as (Study 2) or shortly after the impression formation 
task {Study 3). In this task, participants had to estímate severa! times the 
number of As appearing on a computer screen. For each matrix of As, 
targets' (ingroup vs outgroup) estima tes were provided. Calculating the mean 
distance between targets' estimates and participants' actual judgements 
assessed participants' <:onformity to the target's opinion. 
Results confirmed the general hypothesis (see Table 5 for the results of 
Vaes el al., 2003, Study 3). In the conditions where the targets described 
their past weck with secondary emotions, conformity towards an ingroup 
and an outgroup target diverged. Specifically, participants conformed 
significantly more towards the ingroup than towards the outgroup target. 
This pattern did not appear in primary emotions contexts. In this case, 
conformity towards the two targets was equivalen!. 
Approach and avoidance 
It has been demonstrated that the mere presence of a stimulus can activa te a 
motor response compatible with approach (e.g., ftexing an arm or moving 
towards the stimulus) and avoidance (e.g., ex lending an arm or moving away 
from the stimulus) behaviours (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Wentura, Rothermund, 
& Bak, 2000). Given the importance of approach and avoidance behaviours 
in intergroup interactions, we (Vaes et al., 2003, Expt. 4) proposed that the 
behavioural disposition to approach or avoid an ingroup or an outgroup 
should be inftuenced by the fact that the target expressed him/herself in terms 
of secondary or primary emotions. Specifically, the authors expected thatthe 
common tendency to act in a more positive way towards the ingroup 
compared to the outgroup should especia lly be present in the secondary 
TABLE 5 
Mean dlfference scores from estimates of an ingroup or outgroup target as a function of 
type of emotlon IVaes et al., 2003, Study 3) 
lngroup targcl 
Outgroup target 
M 
so 
M 
so 
Primar)• tmotinm; 
47.91,. 
14.07 
S6.l611e 
18.78 
Set·ondarJ· t motious 
44.63. 
14.18 
65.60. 
19.01 
The table contains distance scores. Consequcntly, thc lower .the numbcr, the more partK:ipants 
conformed towards the e1ltimale of the larget. Logicsl comparisons (i.e., excluding diagonal 
contrasls) thal do not share a common subscripl dirTer al p < .OS. 
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emotion condition, so that the dispositions to approach the ingroup and 10 
avoid the outgroup would appear when secondary emotions are used. 
As in the conformity studies, participants were e~posed to primary or 
secondary emotíons used by an ingroup target (Marco) or outgroup target 
(Almad) to describe theír past week. This time, a picture of Marco, an 
ltalian, and of Almad, a Nigerian, aocompanied their respective emotions. 
After having formed a mental impression of each target, participants were 
instructed that they would see in random order on their computer screen 
pictures of Marco and Almad, and that they had to react with different keys. 
There were only three keys available, which were arranged perpendicular 10 
the screen. Participants were told to keep their finger on the middle key 
when there was no picture on the screen. During a first session, they were 
further instructed to press as fast as possible the upper key (moving towards: 
approach) when seeing the picture of Marco and the lower key (moving 
away: avoidance) for Almad's picture. The order of the keys was reversed 
during the second session. This procedure provided independen t scores for 
approach and avoidance relative to the two targets. 
Table 6 shows the results. When targets e~pressed secondary emotions, 
approach and avoidance responses were relatively facilitated towards the 
ingroup and the outgro~p .target respectively. As expected, the results for 
primary emotions were not significan!. These resuhs are e~tremely 
importan! beca use they show that an ingroup member expressing secondary 
emotions is approached, whereas an outgroup member expressing the same 
emotions is avoided. 
Motivated reasoning 
One ahernative explanation for the preceding resuhs would be that people 
interpret emotional information differently depending on the person who is 
TABLE 6 
Mean react ion times lmsl to approach or avoid an ingroup or outgroup target that 
expresses primary or secondary emotions (Vaes et al .• 2003, Study 41 
Approac/i A I'Oidtttll'(' 
brgroup Outgroup Jngrcmp Outgi'OUJI 
Primary emotions M 998, 937,. 944, 939,. 
so 216.Q7 131.32 113.82 196.74 
S«ondary cmotions M 850. 919 918. 816t, 
so 81.79 168. 16 223.88 11 1.18 
Logical comparisons (i.e .. cxcluding diagonal contrasts) within typc or behaviours that do not 
share a common subseripl difTcr al p < .OS. 
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expressing it. We tested this hypothesis by utilising the overattribution bias 
paradigm (Gaunt, Leyens, & Sindic, 2004). Our reasoning went as follows. 
On the one hand, theories concerning the influence of motivation on social 
inferences suggest that the motivation to arrive at a particular conclusion 
will determine thc hypotheses on which people focus (Kruglanski, 1989; 
Kunda, 1990). In other words, people will search their memory for those 
beliefs and rules that could support their desired conclusion (Kunda, 1990). 
On the other hand, numerous studies have shown that people often 
underutilise situational information and overattribute behaviour to inner 
dispositions (see, e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & 
Corneille, 1996). Building on those models, we predicted that people are 
motivated to avoid the undesirable conclusion that outgroup members share 
the same humanity as ingroup members. Consequently, people will be more 
likely to use situational information to discount humanity inferences in the 
ca~e of an outgroup member reporting secondary emotions. They will look 
for information on situational constraints that could ha ve forced the target 
person to express the specific emotion. 
Participants had to read an essay presumably written by an ingroup oran 
outgroup target. The essay reported the target's frequent experience of a 
primary or á secondary emotion. Depending on the condition, the target 
had been free or not to select the tapie of the essay. Participants then rated 
the extent to which the writer tended to actually experience the 
corrcsponding emotion. Wé predicted that participants would use the 
situational information ("to be forced to write the essay") to discount the 
actual experience of the corresponding emotion only in thc condition where 
an outgroup member expressed a strong tendency to experience a secondary 
emotion. Results confirmed the hypothesis, suggesting that when motivated 
to avoid the undesirable corresponden! humanity attribution, peoplc are 
more sensitive to information about t·he situational constraints on the 
target's behaviour. All the other conditions (i.e., ingroup and outgroup 
reporting primary emotions and ingroup reporting secondary emotions) in 
the experiment replicated the well-documented overattribution bias. 
Summary 
The preceding studies evaluated the behavioural consequences of infra-
humanisation in intergroup settings. Specifically, the following question was 
addressed: Do perceivers react and behave differently -towards an ingroup 
and an outgroup member who gives evidence of possessing uniquely human 
emotions? 
The common underlying hypothesis of all the studies was that, beca use 
secondary emotions are reflective of one's level of humanity, they should be 
reserved to the ingroup (Leyens el al., 2000). Therefore, an outgroup 
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member ex·pressing uniquely human emotions is perceived as attcmpting to 
upgrade him/herself to the ingroup's level. Because this upgrading is 
inconsistent with one's wishes (Gaunt et al., 2004) or because it threatens the 
positive distinctiveness ofthe ingroup by implying human similarity between 
various groups (Vaes et al., 2003), the use of secondary emotions in a 
target's discourse will lead to differential responses as a function of the 
target's group membership. All results confirmed this hypothesis. When 
people express themselves with secondary emotions, the resulting similar 
humanity is beneficial for an ingroup member and dctrimcntal for an 
outgroup member. Obviously, trying to present oneself as a "complete 
human" can backfire when one does not belong to lhe righl group. 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In the present chaptcr we ha ve introduced the theory of infra-humanisation 
as well as empirical evidence supporling its core hypotheses. Since the infra-
humanisation project starled, about 4 years ago, we have accumulated a 
large amounl of data illustraling the importance of uniquely human 
emotions in intergroup relations. All results converge to stress the 
distinction between uniquely and non-uniquely human emotions and to 
show their differential impacts on ingroups vs outgroups. 
Yet infra-humanisation theory is not only based on uniquely human 
emolions. On the contrary, we suggested in the introduction that potential 
infra-humanisation discrimination should apply to all uniquely human 
characteristics; that is, also intelligence, language, and morality. Following 
our lheory, discriminating outgroup members on only one of thesc uniquely 
human characteristics is sufficient 10 qualify for sorne degree of infra-
humanisation. Indeed, we described the human essence as a set of necessary, 
but insufficient, conditions. Therefore, all uniquely human characteristics 
should be rescrved for one's ingroup. Beca use the infra-hurnanisati~n claim 
goes well beyond uniquely human emotions, we should be cautious about 
including thcse other human features in future research. Beca use intelligence 
and language are linked to structural dimensions of society (Glick & Fiske, 
1999), infra-hurnanisation through these features may be limited to high-
status groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Because the moral values tested by 
Schwarz and Bilsky ( 1990) and the human secondary emotions are 
universal, they should not be inftuenced by structural dimcnsions. lnfra-
humanisation through universal values and secondary emotions could, 
however, be affected by the affective relations between the groups. 
Such a line of research would converge wilh a concepl similar to infra-
humanisation. Schwarzand Struch ( 1989, p. 154) spoke of"a lesser perceived 
humanity of the outgroup"-that is, "outgroupers are assumed to share our 
humanity lo a lesser degree". Basing their studies on the perccption of value 
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similarily between groups, Struch and Schwarz (1989) showed that perceived 
dissimilarity between values of groups mediales the aggression of ingroup 
members towards outgroupers. Also, values such as cquality, helpfulness, 
and honesty, all signs ofmorality, typically differentiate the ingroup from an 
outgroup (Schwarz & Struch, 1989; see also Campbell's 1967 notion of 
"universal stereotypes"; LeVine & Cambell , 1972) and correlate with 
willingness for outgroup contact (Sagiv & Schwarz, 1995). 
Even if the distinction between primary and secondary emotioos is not 
very salient in a distracting context, and even though we used sophisticated 
paradigms, it seems almost unthinltable that all outgroups should be infra-
humanised (but see Viki & Abrams, 2003). One of the main tasks for the 
future should therefore be to find theoretical conditions that impede the 
emergence ofinfra-humanisation. At the same time, it is necessary to conduct 
further investigations concerning the links between essentialisation and 
ingroup identification, on the one hand, and infra-humanisation of 
outgroups, on the other hand. Up to now, essentialisation has been examined 
in a single study. Replication of tbe effect would be highly desirable. 
Links with other theories of intergroup confticts are also needed. The 
ingroup projection model (Mummendey & Wenzel , 1999) constitutes an 
obvious example. This model stipulates that, given a common superordinate 
catcgory for ingroup and outgroup, ingroup members will project onto the 
inclusive category those features that are prototypical of themselves. 
Consequently, the more the outgroup is perceived as deviant from the 
prototype of the inclusive category (i.e., the ingroup prototype), the more 
negatively it will be evaluated. One could reverse such an assumption and 
suggest that, given the existence of botb ingroups and outgroups within a 
pre-existing superordinate category, ingroup members will project the 
prototypical features of the inclusive category onto themselves. In other 
words, given that all members of social groups are also, and before anything 
else, human beings, ingroup members should tend to project the 
prototypical human features more onto themselves than onto the outgroup. 
lt follows that ingroupers will perceive themselves as prototypes of what 
human beings are, and consider outgroup members to ha ve lesser humanity. 
Consequently, the more the outgroup is viewed as deviant from the ingroup 
prototype (i.e., tbe human prototype), the more negatively it is evaluated, 
and the more it will be infra-humanised. 
Another example is Brewer's (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory. 
According to this theory, human beings are guided by two fundamental 
needs: a need for assimilation and a need for differentiation. When one of 
thesc needs is not fulfilled, people try to recovcr tbe equilibrium by 
increasing the discrimination between ingmup and outgroup. lt would be 
interesting t·o see how these two needs could impact infra-humanisation. Still 
another example is terror management theory (Becker, 1973). According to 
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this latter theory, the combination of the animal instinct for survival and the 
human awareness that death is inevitable leads to an existential terror. 
Studies have shown that "culture" and the belief in a symbolic "humanity" 
allow us to reduce and manage thoughts linked to death (Goldenberg, 
McCoy, & Pyszczynski , 2000). Also, any reminder of animality as well as 
confrontation with a person who does not share one's vision of the world 
induces a psychologicalthreat. Vaes (2001) hypothesises that only the belief 
in a humanity associated with one's own culture is likely to reduce the 
existential terror-as a consequence any person outside one's own cultural 
boundary will be auributed a lesser degree of humanity. 
Despite the deliciencies in our theory, we rema in convinced of the truth 
contained in the following sentences, wrillen by Jahoda (2002, pp. 2- 3, 
italics in the original), and which will serve as conclusion to this chapter: 
The basic imagc or lhe Othu has been and continues lO be or someone bad. 
immoral, and orten a threal. However. the Oth.r need nol necessarily be physically 
ditrerent and orten wos nol. ( ••• ) the most common cpithet applied to "Othus" hos 
been "beastly". implying that they are less human . These tendcncies. although less 
erude than in the past. have by no means disappeared altogether ... 
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